Winner-Take-All Games: The Strategic Optimisation of Rank
研究在竞争情境中（如体育比赛、销售竞赛）参与者只关心自己得分排名而非绝对分数时的战略选择，分析了不同分布约束下的均衡策略。
In many competitive situations (including nearly all sports) a player’s aim is not simply to maximise his score but to maximise its rank among all scores. Examples include sales contests (where the salesman with the highest monthly sales gets a bonus) and patent races (where lowest time is best). We assume the score X i of player i is obtained costlessly, so that his utility is the probability of having the best score. This gives a constant-sum game. All that matters for player i is the distribution of his score, so we assume he chooses from a given convex set of distributions ℱ i . We call such games distribution ranking games, and characterise their solution for various classes of the distribution sets ℱ i , such as distributions with given mean or moment, where we extend a result of Bell and Cover.