Eco‐labelling by a for‐profit certifier: Countervailing power and its consequences
研究了营利性认证机构在设定生态标签标准时，企业反制力量的影响，发现企业反制力量强时标准会降低，且认证机构议价能力过低时会转向最优报价销售，这改变了税收和补贴对福利的影响方向。
Abstract For‐profit certifier's eco‐labelling is common in industries where firms have some “countervailing power” on sharing gains from labelling. We show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong “power.” A certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain. This switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard. This is consequential for evaluating policies. The dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used, and ultimately upon firms’ countervailing power.