Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition
研究共同价值首价拍卖中投标人数内生决定的情形，发现卖方根据价值征集投标人会导致征集效应，削弱竞争并阻碍信息聚合，甚至出现价格不具竞争性且不聚合任何信息的均衡。
We study a common value, first-price auction in which the number of bidders is endogenous: the seller (auctioneer) knows the value and solicits bidders at a cost. The number of bidders, which is unobservable, may thus depend on the true value. Therefore, being solicited conveys information. This solicitation effect may soften competition and impede information aggregation. Under certain conditions, there is an equilibrium in which the seller solicits many bidders, yet the resulting price is not competitive and fails to aggregate any information. More broadly, these ideas are relevant for markets with adverse selection in which informed traders initiate contacts.