INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND EARNING MANAGEMENT BY BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
研究了机构投资者作为市场约束力量在减少银行控股公司盈余管理中的作用，发现监督型机构持股与盈余管理负相关，对监管有启示。
Abstract We explore the role of institutional investors as a source of market discipline in mitigating earning management (EMGT) by bank holding companies (BHCs). We propose that ownership by monitoring institutions (institutional investors with large and long‐term stakes and independence from managers) is associated with less EMGT because they have greater incentives/skills for monitoring their investees than other shareholders. We find that EMGT by BHCs is negatively associated with ownership by monitoring institutions for larger and riskier banks and for the post‐SunTrust decision period. Nonmonitoring institutional ownership is unassociated or in some cases weakly or even positively associated with EMGT. Our findings suggest that regulators should facilitate ownership by monitoring institutions as a complement to regulation.