Myopic market pricing and managerial myopia
构建了一个衡量市场短视定价的公司层面指标，发现市场短视定价越高的公司，盈余管理越活跃、研发投资越少，且这种效应在管理者迎合市场定价的公司中更显著。
Abstract This paper develops a firm‐level measure of myopic market pricing, which captures the extent to which the market overvalues short‐term expected abnormal earnings relative to longer‐term ones. The empirical analysis shows that myopically priced firms manage earnings more actively and invest less in R&D. The impact of myopic market pricing is concentrated in firms where managers cater more to market pricing, that is, in firms with greater short‐term investor ownership, with CEO compensation that is more sensitive to the firm share price, and with higher equity dependence. Additional tests show that these findings are robust to the consideration of market (under)overpricing. The results suggest that when managers cater to market pricing, market myopia encourages managerial myopia.