Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws against Domestic and Foreign Firms
研究欧盟和美国反垄断机构在卡特尔执法中是否区别对待本国、欧盟、美国及世界其他地区企业，发现欧盟更可能处罚本国和世界其他地区企业，美国则对国外企业处以更高罚款。
Antitrust authorities must decide whether and how to consider the national identities of firms. Authorities may follow a neutral enforcement approach or focus on either foreign or domestic firms. We investigate these issues in the context of cartel enforcement against EU, US, and rest-of-the-world (ROW) firms by the European Union and the United States—the two jurisdictions with the longest and most robust enforcement histories. Our results suggest a mix of behaviors. The European Union is more likely to fine domestic and ROW firms than US firms, and the United States is no more likely to fine EU firms than domestic firms but disproportionately targets ROW firms. With respect to the size of fines, EU enforcement outcomes show no significant differences among categories of firms. The United States, however, levies significantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms, whether from the European Union or the rest of the world.