Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
通过实验研究制度在监管范围外对合作行为、偏好和信念的溢出效应，发现制度能显著提升未受监管游戏中的合作水平，并增强条件性合作偏好和对他人的合作信念。
Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.