Is My Firm-Specific Investment Protected? Overcoming the Stakeholder Investment Dilemma in the Resource-Based View
构建了一个保护机制模型，解决利益相关者（员工、供应商、客户）在企业特定投资中面临的行为和环境不确定性困境，整合多种保护手段以激励投资，并探讨了机制间的冲突与互补。
The resource-based view posits that firms achieve competitive advantage from value creation through firm-specific investments held by key stakeholders: employees, suppliers, and customers. Shareholder-dominant (agency) theory holds that all residual income claimant rights belong to shareholders, circumscribing other key stakeholders’ ability to appropriate value from their investment. However, recent enhancements to stakeholder theory grounded in property rights suggest that such stakeholders may need protection for implicit residual claims. A central purpose of this article is to build a model of the protection devices used to ensure these implicit rights. Individual ex ante devices such as stakeholder ownership only partially incentivize stakeholders’ firm-specific investments because they are subject to two types of uncertainties—behavioral and environmental—and individual devices aimed at reducing one type of uncertainty may exacerbate the other. We therefore expand on efforts to establish a stakeholder theory of strategic management by proposing an integrated model of protection devices, which seeks to overcome the incentive dilemma in reducing both uncertainties by reducing barriers to stakeholder firm-specific investment. Our model also explores the conflicts and complementarities associated with device implementation. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical implications, as well as future research opportunities associated with our model.