The Front Men of Wall Street: The Role of CDO Collateral Managers in the CDO Boom and Bust
研究了ABS CDO抵押品经理的激励，发现专业经理人选择低质量证券以换取更多业务，而多元化经理人则因声誉受损面临投资者撤资。
ABSTRACT I study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for ABS CDOs—securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis. Specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low‐quality securities underwritten by the CDO's arranger. These securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities. Managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments. Diversified managers who did assemble CDOs suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis: institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds. Overall, the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and CDO underwriters.