Stare decisisand judicial log‐rolls: a gains‐from‐trade model
用经济学模型解释法官为何遵循先例，认为不同立场的法官通过交换判决意见实现共赢，并分析了完全妥协与部分妥协的条件。
Abstract The practice of horizontal stare decisis requires that judges occasionally decide cases “incorrectly.” What sustains this practice? Given a heterogeneous bench, we show that the increasing differences in dispositional value property of preferences generates gains when judges trade dispositions over the case‐space. These gains are fully realized by implementing a compromise rule— stare decisis . Absent commitment, we provide conditions that sustain the compromise in a repeated game. When complete compromises become unsustainable, partial compromises still avail. Moreover, judges may prefer to implement partial compromises even when perfect ones are sustainable. Thus, stare decisis is consistent with a partially settled, partially contested legal doctrine.