Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism
研究发现过度自信的CEO倾向于延迟确认损失、使用更不稳健的会计方法，且外部监督未能缓解这一效应，对理解管理者心理如何影响财务报告行为有参考价值。
ABSTRACT Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect. Our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complement the findings by Schrand and Zechman [2011] that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior.