Credit Ratings and Managerial Voluntary Disclosures
研究了管理者是否通过自愿披露产品与业务扩张计划来影响信用评级，发现接近评级变更的公司更可能披露此类信息，且披露是可信的。
Abstract This study investigates whether managers influence credit ratings via voluntary disclosures. I find that firms near a rating change have a higher incidence of a disclosure regarding product and business expansion (PBE) plans. This finding is more evident for firms that are subject to lower proprietary costs of disclosures, which implies that managers do trade off both the benefits and costs of the disclosures. I find no evidence that firms close to a rating change selectively release good news or suppress bad news on PBE. Overall, my results suggest that firms generally exhibit a credible commitment to maintaining disclosure transparency for a desired credit rating.