The redistributive impact of hypocrisy in international taxation
研究了避税天堂为何同意自动交换账户数据，发现美国通过虚伪行为（自身不参与却强制他国执行）实现了对避税天堂的财富再分配，对国际税收政策制定者和研究者有参考价值。
Abstract Why do tax havens, whose attractiveness for foreign investors depends upon financial secrecy, agree to automatically report account data to foreign governments? From a contractualist perspective, their cooperation should be motivated by the expectation of joint gains. Prior to such agreement, however, tax havens expected outflows of foreign capital and reductions in economic activity as likely outcomes. We show that the United States (US) imposed automatic information exchange on these countries without itself participating. The result is a strongly redistributive regime that worsens the economic situation of tax havens. By means of a difference‐in‐differences analysis, we ascertain a substantial and statistically significant negative effect of a US sanction threat on the value of assets held by foreigners in tax havens relative to non‐havens. The effect becomes stronger when the US is included in the non‐haven group. The analysis confirms the US's ability to redistribute financial wealth internationally through organized hypocrisy.