打断渐进制度变迁:“连续性代理人”如何拖延甚至逆转以色列的渐进福利国家改革

Interrupting gradual institutional change: how ‘continuity agents’ have stalled and even reversed gradual welfare-state reforms in Israel

Journal of European Public Policy · 2017
被引 28
ABS 3

中文导读

研究了渐进制度变迁机制(如分层、漂移和转换)如何引发政治对抗,通过以色列两项福利改革案例,说明“连续性代理人”如何利用这些机制的特点拖延或逆转改革。

Abstract

Various influential studies demonstrate the political power of mechanisms of gradual institutional change, such as layering, drift and conversion, in overcoming the pressures of institutional continuity and driving major policy reforms and welfare-state reforms in particular. This article contributes to this body of work by focusing on the inherent possibilities for political contestation that such gradual change mechanisms are likely to generate. The authors argue that characteristics of gradual change mechanisms – their long duration, cumulative character and the presence of pre-change institutions – are likely to enable the opposition of ‘continuity agents’ and provide them with political opportunities to stall or even reverse gradual institutional changes. The authors demonstrate these theoretical assertions through an in-depth study of two gradually implemented welfare-state reforms in Israel: the welfare-to-work reform, which was eventually reversed by its opponents, and the privatization of housing for people with intellectual disabilities, which has been stalled by its adversaries.

政治经济学福利国家改革制度变迁以色列政治