When and Why Do Venture-Capital-Backed Companies Obtain Venture Lending?
研究了早期风险投资人在考虑引入后期风险投资或风险贷款时的决策，发现高质量公司更倾向风险贷款，而高不确定性时更倾向风险投资。
I model the decision of an informed early-stage venture capital (VC) investor that considers involving an uninformed VC or venture lending (VL) investor to finance the late stage. Early-stage VC investors that own high-quality value companies tend to signal their quality and they frequently turn to VL investors. Early-stage VC investors prefer VC if the proportion of high-quality companies in the population is high, if their companies have a high upside potential, if they can benefit from the value that late-stage VC investors add, or if uncertainty is high. I find empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.