It Is Not Only What You Know, It Is Also Who You Know: CEO Network Connections and Financial Reporting Quality
研究发现CEO的外部关系网络越大，公司的财务报告质量越高，表现为更少的应计利润操纵、财务重述和内部控制缺陷，且审计质量更高、审计费用更高。
SUMMARY The study investigates whether CEOs' external connections with other executives and directors are associated with enhanced financial reporting quality. We find that CEOs with larger connections have lower discretionary accruals and are less likely to have financial restatements and material internal control weaknesses. Further results show that larger social networks are associated with higher audit quality, which translates into higher audit fees. The results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, including controls for endogeneity, and are consistent with well-connected CEOs providing economic benefits to their firms, rather than using their position to extract rents at the expense of shareholders.