What Are Boards For? Evidence from Closely Held Firms in Colombia
利用哥伦比亚私营公司调查数据，研究董事会存在的原因及其在控制股东与少数股东之间的权力平衡如何影响控制权、流动性和增长之间的权衡，最终影响公司绩效。
Abstract Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade‐offs between control, liquidity, and growth and, ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.