When weak governments confront inclusive trade unions: The politics of protecting labour market outsiders in the age of dualization
本文研究为何一些欧洲福利国家比其他国家更好地保护劳动力市场局外人（如临时工、失业者），发现当政府因内部分裂或悬浮议会而弱势时，会与包容性工会谈判，从而为局外人提供补偿。
Some European welfare states protect outsiders from economic uncertainty better than others. Conventional theories attribute this either to the material interests of producer groups or the vote-seeking actions of political parties. By contrast, this article focuses on the interaction between trade unions and governments, drawing on empirical experience in Austria and Sweden. High levels of inclusiveness provide trade unions with a powerful interest in protecting outsiders. Governments, however, have moved towards dualistic policy choices, but when weakened by intra-coalitional divisions or a hung parliament, they retain a political incentive to negotiate political deals with trade unions, and this forces them to compensate outsiders for economic uncertainty.