BANK FAILURES UNDER MANAGERIAL AND REGULATORY INEFFICIENCY: THREE DECADES OF EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY
利用土耳其1970-2003年数据，通过多种效率指标分析发现，倒闭银行在所有效率维度上均显著低于幸存银行，且管理低效比政治低效更关键，流动性、资本和货币风险与糟糕管理结合是危机前致命组合。
Abstract Drawing on a comprehensive data set from Turkey (1970–2003) and using both nonparametric (data envelopment analysis) and parametric (stochastic frontier analysis) frontier methods, we estimate 16 alternative efficiency measures to study their associations with the probability of bank failures in an emerging market setting. We find that failed banks severely underperform survived banks in all forms of efficiency and that their subpar performance deteriorates closer to failure, prosperous times and bloated scales tend to precede eventual banking fatalities, managerially induced (technical) inefficiencies dominate politically induced (allocative) inefficiencies in failed banks, and banks with new ownership and affiliation with other businesses are more likely to fail. The results also caution that liquidity, capital, and currency risks combined with poor management are a lethal mix ahead of crises.