On elicitation-method effect in game experiments: a competing newsvendor perspective
通过实验比较策略方法与直接反应法在竞争报童问题中的行为差异，发现两种方法下订单决策无显著差异，建议策略方法可用于提高实验效率。
To test the behavioral validity of the strategy method in a setting of operations management, we experimentally investigate competing newsvendor behavior under incomplete information with both the strategy method and the direct-response method. We observe that the ‘‘pull-to-center’’ effect exists only with low margin; mean order quantity with high margin does not significantly deviate from equilibrium prediction. We build a behavioral model based on overestimation and mean anchoring to explain competing newsvendor behavior. Estimates of the behavioral model confirm the existence of the behavioral biases. Meanwhile, order levels are not significantly different between the strategy method and the direct-response method. Hence, we suggest that the strategy method should lead to similar decisions in newsvendor settings compared to the direct-response method and may be adopted in most operations management settings associated to the newsvendor problem to improve the efficiency of experimental studies.