Regulatory Quality and Global Specialist Auditor Fee Premiums
用更大样本和更长时间段验证了全球行业专业审计师收费更高，并发现监管越严格的国家，这种溢价越大，说明高质量审计与严格监管互为补充。
SUMMARY We first confirm the findings of Carson (2009) that global industry-specialist auditors earn a fee premium using a larger sample and a more extended time period. We then examine the effect of regulatory quality on the association between auditor industry specialization and audit fee premiums. We find that there are larger fee premiums for global specialist auditors in countries with stricter regulatory quality, indicating greater support for the argument that high-quality auditors can act as a complement to higher regulatory quality. We compare and reconcile our findings to prior studies, and show that inferences based on national-level auditor industry specialization differ from those based on examining global-level industry specialization.