Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency
通过实验室实验比较了基于举报的审计方案与随机审计方案的相对效率，发现举报方案能更精准地锁定逃税者、减少逃税金额并提高税收征缴率。
SUMMARY This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing‐based audit scheme compared to a random‐based audit scheme. We design a between‐subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random‐based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing‐based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.