PLATFORM PRICING IN MIXED TWO‐SIDED MARKETS
研究了消费者同时出现在双边市场（如eBay上既买又卖的用户）时，平台捆绑服务及最优定价的通用模型，给出了基于需求弹性和网络外部性调整的简单定价公式。
Abstract When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two‐sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. I develop a general model for such “mixed” two‐sided markets and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price‐cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate “two‐sidedness.” The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.