New public management and the rule of economic incentives: Australian welfare-to-work from job market signalling perspective
研究了澳大利亚福利到工作体系在私有化后引入经济激励的效果，发现激励框架导致求职者和顾问的理性行为与政策预期相悖，降低了系统绩效。
Australia’s welfare-to-work system has undergone radical changes since the 1990s, with service delivery fully privatized in 2003 and incentives of various kinds introduced to underpin jobseeker and employment consultant activation. Informed by New Public Management (NPM), the reforms are intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency by addressing the problems of information asymmetry at different levels of the system. However, operationalizing NPM principles generated technical and regulatory challenges, and in this case, the incentive framework undermines some of the reform’s basic assumptions. This can trigger jobseekers’ and consultants’ rational decision-making behaviours which run contrary to programme expectations, hence generating suboptimal performance.