Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
研究了一类带有证据的机制设计问题，发现承诺并非必要、随机化无价值、稳健激励相容无成本，并通过构建披露博弈说明无承诺时委托人仍能获得与最优承诺机制相同的收益。
We show that in a class of I ‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i , we construct a simple disclosure game between the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mechanism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In this equilibrium, the principal obtains the same payoff as in the optimal mechanism with commitment. As an application, we show that certain costly verification models can be characterized using equilibrium analysis of an associated model of evidence.