The role of unaffiliated bankers on conditional conservatism: Evidence from IFRS information shock
利用IFRS强制采用作为条件保守主义需求变化的来源，研究发现有独立银行家在董事会的公司条件保守主义水平显著提高，且该作用受企业特定激励影响。
Abstract We exploit IFRS mandatory adoption as a source of variation in the demand for conditional conservatism to examine the role of unaffiliated bankers on the level of conditional conservatism. We show that firms with unaffiliated bankers on boards of directors experience a significant increase in the level of conditional conservatism compared with firms without unaffiliated bankers on boards. These findings hold after we account for other country‐level factors that shape the demand for conditional conservatism. Additional analyses show that the role of unaffiliated bankers on conditional conservatism depends also on firm‐specific incentives arising from the contracting environment. Taken together, our findings provide new insights into the role of corporate governance arrangements on financial reporting outcomes.