Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
研究在双边贸易模型中，买方对商品估值不确定时，如何设计信号结构最大化买方期望收益，发现买方最优信号结构能实现有效交易和单位弹性需求。
This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price.