Monitoring by Affiliated Bankers on Board of Directors: Evidence from Corporate Financing Outcomes
研究美国大型非金融公司董事会中有银行背景的董事（关联银行家）对公司融资的影响，发现其能增加债务融资、降低借款成本并减少抵押和财务限制条款。
Using a hand‐collected data set on boards of directors of large US nonfinancial companies, this paper investigates the effects of the presence of a creditor on a company's board. The results suggest that the presence of a creditor: 1) increases the amount of debt in a company's capital structure via an increase in private debt, 2) decreases the sensitivity of debt financing to the amount of tangible assets that a company holds, 3) decreases the cost of borrowing, and 4) reduces the pledge of collateral and financial covenants in debt contracts.