Managerial gaming of stock and option grants
研究了管理层在不同类型股权授予中的操纵行为，发现传统股票期权在授予后更易被操纵，建议企业预设条款并采用平均价格挂钩的期权来防范。
Abstract In this paper, we examine managerial gaming of different types of equity grants, both at the initial award of the equity grants ( front‐end gaming ) and the unwinding of the equity holdings in the future ( back‐end gaming ). We find that the potential gains from stock price manipulation vary substantially across different types of equity grants. While traditional stock option grants are less vulnerable to front‐end gaming, they are more vulnerable to back‐end gaming than other types of equity grants (e.g., restricted stock grants). To prevent or discourage managerial gaming, firms should preset all terms of the equity grant in advance and link its future payoff to average stock prices (e.g., by granting Asian stock options).