Common Values and Low Reserve Prices
证明在共同价值升序拍卖中，高保留价格的收益低于观测上等价的私人价值情形，且最优保留价格可能低于卖方估值，这对拍卖设计有重要启示。
I show that the benefit of a high reserve price in a common‐values ascending auction is lower than in the observationally equivalent private values setting. Put another way, when bidders have common values, empirical estimation based on a private‐values model will overstate the value of a high reserve price. Via numerical examples, I show this same ranking typically applies to the level of the optimal reserve price as well, and often to the benefit of any reserve price, not just high ones. With common values, the optimal reserve can even be below the seller's valuation, which is impossible with private values.