Do Highly Unionized Companies Compensate Their CEOs Less in Periods of Financial Distress? Evidence from Canada
研究加拿大上市公司中工会化程度对CEO薪酬的影响，发现财务危机期间CEO薪酬未降，高工会化公司反而支付更高薪酬，尤其在非股权部分。
In this article, the author studies the strategic interaction between employee stakeholders, in particular labor unions, and top management, and he evaluates the effect of the two parties’ inherent competitive rent-seeking behavior on CEO pay. Using a panel of firms listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, the author shows that CEO compensation withstood the financial crisis (2008–2011) despite lower and even negative corporate performance. Further, highly unionized companies were associated with higher CEO pay in terms of non-equity elements such as salary and pension allocations. The presence of unions had no observed effect in reducing bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock units. These findings have implications for the debate on income inequality and the power of unions to bring about change.