Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*
研究了瑞典难民获得庇护后的住房分配问题，提出一个简单易行的匹配机制，能高效、稳定地让最多难民与房东配对，且没有难民和房东互相更中意对方的情况。
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.