PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT
研究了在公共品供给问题中，委托人面临宪法约束（机制需经代理人按预设投票规则批准）时，如何设计机制实现最优效率，并讨论了歧视性机制禁止、投票买卖等情形下的最优投票规则。
Abstract This article studies the public good provision problem, in which the principal faces a constitutional constraint in the sense that in order for a public good provision mechanism to be implemented, it must first be approved by agents under a prespecified voting rule. I find that as long as the voting rule is not the unanimity rule, the principal can propose a mechanism such that first‐best efficiency of provision of the public good is achieved. I also consider various constraints, such as prohibition of discriminatory mechanisms and the existence of vote buying, and discuss optimal voting rules in these situations.