Mitigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Venture Capital Financing: The Influence of the Country's Institutional Setting
研究风险投资家如何在不同制度环境下通过尽职调查和合同条款缓解与创业企业之间的代理问题，发现制度支持透明度时信号作用减弱，而股东权利保护强时合同条款更有效。
A venture capitalist (VC) needs to trade off benefits and costs when attempting to mitigate agency problems in their investor-investee relationship. We argue that signals of ventures complement the VC's capacity to screen and conduct a due diligence during the preinvestment phase, but its attractiveness may diminish in institutional settings supporting greater transparency. Similarly, whereas a VC may opt for contractual covenants to curb potential opportunism by ventures in the postinvestment phase, this may only be effective in settings supportive of shareholder rights enforcement. Using an international sample of VC contracts, our study finds broad support for these conjectures. It delineates theoretical and practical implications for how investors can best deploy their capital in different institutional settings while nurturing their relationships with entrepreneurs.