The structural-informational power of business: credibility, signalling and the UK banking reform process
本文研究企业权力为何随时间变化，通过英国银行业改革案例，说明企业通过可信信号影响政策，而政策过程结构和企业声誉调节其影响力。
This article seeks to provide a better understanding of why business power varies over time and between firms. It assumes that business influence derives from firms’ ability to send credible information signals about policy costs, causing policy-makers to amend proposals. This ‘structural-informational’ power is mediated by two factors. First, the structure of the policy process enables policy-makers to assess the credibility of industry claims through institutional screening mechanisms, which vary over time. Second, the influence of individual firms is dependent on anticipated policy costs and past reputational damage, leading them to pursue different signalling strategies to maximize credibility. These claims are illustrated using the case study of United Kingdom banking reform between 2010 and 2013. Structural-informational power helps to explain why bank ‘ring-fencing’ reforms were agreed in the face of powerful industry opposition, but also why specific banks were subsequently able to extract important policy concessions.