The Effect of Increased Audit Disclosure on Managers' Real Operating Decisions: Evidence from Disclosing Critical Audit Matters
研究了关键审计事项披露如何影响管理者在贷款发放和商品风险对冲中的实际经营决策，发现披露会减少风险降低活动，但对风险增加活动影响较小，揭示了审计披露的意外后果。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether and how a “critical audit matter” (CAM) disclosure affects managers' real operating decisions in two contexts (issuing a loan that decreases versus increases the average risk profile of loan portfolios, or choosing to hedge versus speculate on commodity risk). We expect that a CAM disclosure increases disclosure costs and implies expanded auditor support for both types of activities, but we expect implied auditor support to be valued more highly for risk-increasing than for risk-decreasing activities. As a result, we predict that a CAM disclosure decreases managers' risk-decreasing activities (due to increased disclosure costs) more than managers' risk-increasing activities (as the implied auditor support counteracts the increased disclosure costs). We find evidence consistent with our prediction across multiple experiments. Our study sheds light on the unintended consequences of a CAM disclosure and provides insight to relevant parties as the new standard goes into effect.