Collusion in Markets with Syndication
研究了辛迪加市场中，市场集中度下降和进入反而可能促进合谋的现象，通过拒绝与降价者组成辛迪加来提高其生产成本，从而维持合谋价格。
Many markets are syndicated, including those for initial public offerings, club deal leveraged buyouts, and debt issuances; in such markets, each winning bidder invites competitors to join a syndicate to complete production. We show that in syndicated markets, collusion may become easier as market concentration falls and market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price, thereby raising that firm’s production costs. Our results can thus rationalize the paradoxical empirical observations that many real-world syndicated markets exhibit seemingly collusive pricing despite low levels of market concentration.