Promotion: Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers
研究雇主在员工可能被竞争对手挖角时，如何通过晋升和工资决策来应对。晋升会向其他公司传递信号，可能引发离职，因此雇主可能提供高工资以阻止竞争对手竞价或挖人，同时也会放弃晋升一些本应晋升的员工。
This paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when employees may be more valuable to competing firms, even in the presence of firm specific human capital. Competing employers must incur a cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager. Because promotion signal that workers are potentially valuable managers in other firms, it can induce turnover. To preempt competition for a promoted worker, an employer may offer a wage so high that it discourages competitors from acquiring information and bidding up the wage further or hiring the worker away. Also, to avoid competition, employers will fail to promote some less well-matched workers who should be promoted.