Affirmative Action Exemptions and Capacity Constrained Firms
研究了公共采购中平权行动豁免如何在不损害弱势企业利用率的情况下提升效率并降低政府支出，利用爱荷华州交通部的独特项目发现承包商利用豁免平滑对产能受限弱势企业的需求。
This paper studies how affirmative action exemptions in public procurement can improve efficiency and government expenditures without harming disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) utilization. I examine a unique program employed by the Iowa Department of Transportation, where prior to 2013 prime contractors were allowed an exemption from a project's affirmative action requirement if their history of DBE utilization was sufficiently high. I find that prime contractors use the exemption to smooth demands on capacity constrained DBEs, building a history of utilization during low demand periods and exploiting the resulting exemption during high demand. The exemption policy was unexpectedly eliminated in 2013, which I exploit to evaluate its effect on DBE utilization and procurement costs. I find that average DBE utilization was unchanged and bids rose on affirmative action contracts.