Financial Flexibility and Manager–Shareholder Conflict: Evidence from REITs
利用房地产投资信托数据，研究发现使用包含标准化契约的无担保债务会降低杠杆率，且低杠杆与更高企业价值相关，在治理薄弱时无担保债务契约可作为经理人承诺机制保持债务容量以增强财务灵活性。
Abstract Using equity Real Estate Investment Trust data, we show empirically that the use of unsecured debt, which contains standardized covenants that place limits on total leverage and the use of secured debt, is associated with lower leverage outcomes. We then show that firm value is sensitive to leverage levels, where lower leverage is associated with higher firm value. In the presence of weak managerial governance, our results suggest that unsecured debt covenants function as a managerial commitment device that preserves the firm's debt capacity to enhance financial flexibility.