The Anatomy of Corruption: The Practice of Pension Fund Trustee Decisionmaking
本文扩展了养老基金受托人决策模型，聚焦社会心理学因素（如合议、正当化），分析腐败如何及为何发生，尤其针对社区开发项目，并讨论当前信托法和个案裁决的不足。
The model of pension plan trustee decisionmaking introduced in a previous paper is extended here emphasising aspects of the social psychology of investment decisionmaking, including collegiality and the necessity of justification. To give the analysis structure, I begin with the framing logic of Kahneman and Tversky and introduce three different frames structuring decisionmaking, starting with the ‘weapons of influence’, the ‘strategies of justification’, and, finally, the ‘emotions of relationships’. The focus of the paper is on how and why corruption occurs in trustee decisionmaking, especially concerning community development projects. Implications are drawn from the model of corruption for current debate over the proper scope of regulation. It is argued that the current system of trust law and case-by-case adjudication is inadequate in the face of the systematic nature of corruption and the potential harm occasioned by corrupt trustee decisionmaking. It is also argued that the model of corruption sketched in this paper can be applied to a wide range of investment decisions, not just community development projects (the initial reference point for the paper).