Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
研究发现，在简单实验任务中作弊的印度学生更偏好公共部门工作，且这种作弊行为能预测公务员未来的腐败行为，表明不诚实者可能自我选择进入政府。
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.