Demand Response: Smart Market Designs for Smart Consumers
研究了日前电力市场中的高峰时段返利合同，指出其存在套利机会，并证明激励相容的设计等价于可变关键高峰定价，探讨了自愿加入下的最优合同设计。
We study Peak-Time-Rebates (PTR) contracts in day-ahead electricity markets.Such contracts reward customers for reducing their consumption when wholesale prices are high. We start by pointing out that these market designs create arbitrage opportunities which, under asymmetric information, incentivize strategic consumers to inflate their baseline. We then show that an incentive compatible PTR design is equivalent to a variable Critical-Peak-Pricing design (vCPP), in which customers have to purchase their peak consumption at the spot price. Under asymmetric information, a relevant question is thus to design vCPP contracts optimally in order to achieve high enrollment rates under voluntary opt-in. This problem has different solutions depending on whether policy-makers choose to maintain existing cross-subsidies or not.