Public Goods in Endogenous Networks
研究了异质性参与者在内生网络中提供地方公共品的博弈，发现成本差异导致金字塔形完全多部图，而估值差异产生嵌套分割图，且网络对不平等的影响取决于异质性来源。
We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large societies, few players produce a lot; furthermore, networks dampen inequality under cost heterogeneity and increase it under heterogeneity in valuation.