More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing
研究现金受限企业在学习项目价值时，如何通过选择投资时机向不知情投资者传递信心信号，导致投资时机扭曲：学习快时提前投资，慢时推迟投资。
We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction.