The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement
构建了一个邻里守望的动态模型，发现犯罪率可能随惩罚加重而上升，因为招募新成员依赖对犯罪的恐惧，这一发现与实证文献一致，并讨论了政策含义。
We propose a dynamic model of neighbourhood watch schemes. While the state chooses punishment levels, apprehension of criminals depends on the watchfulness of citizens. We show that, contrary to standard intuition, crime levels can increase in punishments. This is because neighbourhood watch schemes can fall victim to their own success if recruitment of new members is driven by fear of crime - a finding that is in line with the empirical literature. We discuss the policy implications of this result and show how it extends to the more general problem of norm enforcement among interacting citizens.