Managerial Short-Termism, Turnover Policy, and the Dynamics of Incentives
研究在项目开发动态模型中，管理者可能通过降低质量来加快项目进度，委托人通过长期绩效支付和减少解雇风险来抑制短视行为，模型预测管理者离职率与递延薪酬负相关。
I study managerial short-termism in a dynamic model of project development with hidden effort and imperfect observability of quality. The manager can complete the project faster by reducing quality. To preempt this behavior, the prin cipal makes payments contingent on long-term outcomes. I analyze the dynamics of the optimal contract and its implications for the level of managerial turnover. I show that optimal contracts might be stationary and entail no termination. In general, I show that the principal reduces the manager’s temptation to behave myopically by reducing the likelihood of termination and deferring compensation. The model predicts a negative relation between the rate of managerial turnover and the use of deferred compensation that is consistent with evidence of managerial compensation contracts. Received May 23, 2016; editorial decision May 27, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.