Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns
针对商品同质且投标人具有递增回报的情形，设计了一种高效的动态采购拍卖机制，通过投标人报告愿意出售的数量区间来逐步发现有效结果，并证明该机制能实现有效均衡和VCG价格。
For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The process repeats with successively lower prices, until the efficient outcome is discovered. We demonstrate an equilibrium that is efficient and generates VCG prices.