Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
研究了在投资完全关系专用时，信息不对称如何影响所有权对投资激励和总剩余的作用，发现即使只有一方投资，将所有权给另一方也可能最优。
In the Grossman–Hart–Mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments (i.e., the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment decision and even when the owner’s expected disagreement payoff is larger under A-ownership.