A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets
构建了多对多匹配市场的稳定性理论，给出了集合稳定集非空的条件及算法，并证明其与成对稳定集及非合作议价模型预测一致，为市场设计提供理论基础。
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.